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INTRODUCTION
Few areas of corporate governance have received as much atten-
tion as executive compensation. In the nineteenth century, robber
barons were criticized and mocked, and in the early twentieth century,
newspapers frequently disparaged top executives.' These criticisms
have continued into the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries
and intensified as politicians, activists, writers, and filmmakers have
explored various aspects of executive compensation.2 The central
conflict that executive-compensation plans must address is essentially
an evolution of the agency conundrum. As ownership and manage-
ment separated in our economic system, people entered into agency
relationships, with corporate executives managing a corporation on
behalf of shareholders.3 The interests of the shareholders and execu-
tives differ, however, as an executive is generally interested in his or
her personal gain rather than in maximizing shareholders' income
and wealth. 4 In theory, a well-constructed executive-compensation
plan will align the interests of those managing the corporation with
the interests of shareholders, who own the corporation. Despite the
efforts of many individuals, this conflict of interests continues and per-
vades the process of crafting executive-compensation plans. In this
Note, I argue that courts can address this problem by policing the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in its regulation of cor-
porate disclosures regarding executive compensation. Although the
SEC currently requires that corporations present all pertinent execu-
tive-compensation information in a manner that is concise and under-
1 See, e.g., IRA T. KMY & STEVEN VAN PUTTEN, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF EXECUTIVE PAY
47-48 (2007).
2 See id. at 47, 48-51; ENRON: THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE RooM (Magnolia Pictures
2005).
3 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 15-16 (2004).
4 See id.
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standable,5 the SEC's enforcement of these rules, which courts have
been hesitant to impede, often penalizes shareholders-the victims of
executive-compensation problems-by requiring that the corporation
pay the penalty.6
In addressing this issue, I first describe the process of how most
public companies develop executive-compensation plans and policies.
In this overview, I explain that economic compensation is a polycen-
tric issue that is shaped by federal and state laws, administrative agen-
cies, and private organizations and actors. Second, I discuss recent
trends in executive compensation (particularly the dramatic increase
in levels of compensation in absolute and relative terms) as well as the
important features of modern executive-compensation plans. Third, I
address the contentious issue of whether there is a "problem" with the
current system of executive compensation. In this discussion, I pre-
sent the arguments of those who argue that no such problem exists or
that the problem is insignificant,7 those who argue that the problem is
one that corporations should address themselves,8 and those who ar-
gue that there is a significant problem that public actors must
address.9
After explaining why I conclude that there is a problem with ex-
ecutive-compensation practices, I describe legislative attempts begin-
ning in 1992 to address this problem. This description includes
legislation introduced in the summer of 2009 that would significantly
affect the current executive-compensation regime. I then discuss and
explain the shortcomings of another method for reforming executive-
compensation practices-derivative suits by shareholders. Next, I de-
scribe Judge Jed Rakoff's decision in SEC v. Bank of America Corp.1o
Although this decision may appear to have little significance for exec-
utive-compensation practices, I will explain why Judge Rakoffs ap-
proach in denying a settlement between the SEC and Bank of America
(which involved misleading disclosures to shareholders regarding ex-
ecutive bonuses following Bank of America's merger with Merrill
5 See MARK A. BORGES, SEC EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE RULEs 2, 33-34
(2008); GARY M. BROWN, PLI's GUIDE TO THE SEC's EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ANDRE-
LATED PARTY TRANSACTION DISCLOSURE RULES 19 (2d ed. 2007).
6 See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
7 See KAY & VAN PUTrEN, supra note 1, at 1-3; Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue
Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 306
(2009).
8 See Nathan Knutt, Note, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal
Thyself 47 ARIz. L. REV. 493, 495 (2005).
9 See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 4-36, 122-23, 180 (arguing that the
corporate governance structure creates executive-compensation problems).
10 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying proposed consent judgment).
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Lynch)" can potentially ameliorate current problems with executive
compensation. Specifically, I argue that improved enforcement by
the SEC could dramatically improve executive-compensation practices
and address many of the problems that scholars and commentators
identify. To ensure that the SEC improves its enforcement of execu-
tive-compensation disclosures, I argue that courts should follow the
lead of Judge Rakoff and require that the SEC thoroughly investigate
companies and identify individuals responsible for failing to disclose
accurate information. If the SEC and courts guarantee that investors
will receive all pertinent information, investors will then be able to
address any remaining problems themselves. I conclude by describing
why this approach is superior to several other proposals.
BACKGROUND
I
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION PLANS
A. The Regulatory Environment
Rules and regulations from a variety of sources govern executive
compensation at public companies. Public companies must follow
state (usually Delaware) and federal laws, rules and regulations from
the SEC and other government agencies (such as the Internal Reve-
nue Service), and rules that self-regulatory organizations (such as the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which merged the
regulatory arms of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD))12 now require for
listing securities.13 Each state has laws governing corporations, and
the laws of the state in which a corporation is incorporated bind the
corporation.14 Delaware law governs most corporations, and, as a re-
sult, Delaware has developed a highly specialized and highly regarded
judiciary that can react quickly to new developments.' 5 Because of
these institutional advantages, corporations generally prefer to incor-
porate and remain in Delaware.16 Self-regulatory organizations, in-
cluding the NYSE, NASD, and FINRA, have adopted many rules that
affect executive compensation in some manner. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, both the NYSE and NASD adopted rules, which the SEC ap-
11 See Michael Orey, Do Shareholder Class Actions Make Sense?, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 28,
2009, at 66.
12 SeeJenniferJ. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L.
151, 156 n.29 (2010).
13 Simmons, supra note 7, at 323.
14 Jaclyn Braunstein, Note, Pound Foolish: Challenging Executive Compensation in the U.S.
and the U.K., 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 747, 750 (2004).
15 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 594 (2003).
16 See id. at 590.
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proved, requiring that the board of directors of every listed
corporation have a majority of its directors be "independent."' 7 Addi-
tionally, every corporation has a charter (or articles of incorporation)
and bylaws that together list the duties, roles, and rights of sharehold-
ers, executives, and directors.' 8 These rules and regulations provide
the framework in which corporations develop their executive-compen-
sation plans.
B. How Corporations Develop and Implement Executive-
Compensation Plans
American corporations resemble "representative democra-
c[ies]."19 Although shareholders play a limited role, they do elect the
board of directors and are allowed to vote on significant matters,20
like a proposed change to the corporate charter. The directors of a
corporation create compensation packages for the executives on be-
half of the corporation's shareholders. 21 Although differences among
boards exist, boards tend to act similarly when crafting executive-com-
pensation plans.22
Generally, a board will form a specialized compensation commit-
tee to make decisions regarding executive compensation.23 The NYSE
requires its listed companies to have compensation committees com-
posed of only independent directors. 24 The compensation committee
then relies on hired consultants and experts to provide it with infor-
mation on common practices and data that allow the committee to
craft an executive-compensation plan. 25 Compensation committees
usually retain lawyers and hold frequent meetings to evaluate execu-
tives.26 After the compensation committee develops a compensation
plan, the entire board of directors reviews the plan and officially de-
cides how to compensate the company's executives.27 Investors then
17 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 24. Generally, directors are "independent" if
"they are not current or former employees of the firm and are not affiliated with the firm
other than through their directorship." Id.
18 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L. REV.
833, 837, 844-45 (2005) (discussing the roles of corporate actors and how various corpo-
rate codes treat bylaws); Braunstein, supra note 14, at 750 (discussing articles of incorpora-
tion as well as the roles of shareholders and directors).
19 Bebchuk, supra note 18, at 837.
20 Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance,
CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673, 679 (2005).
21 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 18.
22 See id. at 74-75.
23 D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensa-
tion, 81 TUL. L. REv. 829, 869 (2007).
24 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 24.
25 See id. at 38-39, 70.
26 Joann S. Lublin, Boards Flex Their Pay Muscles, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2008, at R1.
27 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 24; Simmons, supra note 7, at 310.
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rely on accurate and complete disclosure of the compensation plan,
along with other related information, to assess the company.28
C. Components of Executive Compensation
The exact details of executive-compensation regimes and prac-
tices vary tremendously among companies. 29 Nevertheless, many simi-
larities are also present. First, for example, executive pay packages are
usually quite large, with the chief executive officers (CEOs) of many
companies earning more than one hundred times what the average
company employee earns.3 0 Executive compensation usually includes
a fixed base salary, a bonus scheme (usually consisting of stock op-
tions and other incentive plans), perquisites (including pension plans,
company cars, use of company aircraft, and other "perks"), and condi-
tional promises of severance payments. 31 Some executives, usually
CEOs, also receive significant signing bonuses or upfront payments,
which a board may justify as necessary to attract highly qualified
candidates. 32
D. Trends in Executive Compensation
The most significant trend in executive compensation is, simply
stated, the recent and dramatic increase in executive compensation.
Between 1992 and 2000, the average compensation (controlled for in-
flation) of CEOs of Standard & Poor's 500 companies increased from
$3.5 million to $14.7 million.33 The compensation that top executives
earned also increased relative to other company employees. In 1991,
the CEO of a large company earned, on average, 140 times what the
average employee earned; by 2003, an average CEO at a large com-
pany earned 500 times what the average employee earned.34 This in-
crease in compensation is so large that neither growth in firm size,
nor improvements in company performance, nor changes in industry
practice explain it.
A second major trend in executive compensation is the rise of
equity-based compensation,3 6 which began as an effort to link execu-
tive compensation to performance.3 7 Nevertheless, if boards of direc-
28 Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC's Efforts to Regu-
late Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 485-86 (2007).
29 KAY & VAN PUTTEN, supra note 1, at 141.
30 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 1.
31 Simmons, supra note 7, at 312-13.
32 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 130-31.
33 Id. at 1.
34 Id.
35 See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth ofExecutive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL'Y 283, 283 (2005).
36 Id. at 283, 289.
37 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 137; KAY & VAN PurrEN, supra note 1, at 2.
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tors that craft these equity-incentive plans do not use indexing
(comparing the change in the company's stock price to an index com-
posed of other companies, which would identify relative perform-
ance) to calculate compensation, this practice may frequently lead to
executives receiving "windfalls" unrelated to their performance.3 8
Along with this increase in compensation, however, there has
been a trend toward greater transparency and disclosure of executive-
compensation practices.39 Charles Yablon argues that the increase in
disclosure actually contributed to the increase in compensation, as
boards and compensation committees often believe that their execu-
tives are "above-average" and thus use the disclosed information to set
compensation levels for their own executives above the average. 40
Still, the increased transparency of executive-compensation practices
does not necessarily explain this ratcheting effect. Furthermore, be-
cause advisors and consultants often provide corporate boards and
compensation committees with data about a company's peers, includ-
ing their executive-compensation practices, boards and compensation
committees would still likely set their executives' pay above the aver-
age even without public disclosure requirements. 41 Although the
trends in rising executive compensation are apparent, not all agree
that these trends present a problem.
II
DOES AN EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION "PROBLEM" EXIST?
Despite the increases in total and relative compensation that ex-
ecutives receive, significant debate exists over whether this constitutes
a "problem." Some believe that American executive-compensation
practices are "well-executed," provide high pay for excellent perform-
ance and low pay for poor performance, and have contributed to im-
mense economic growth that has benefited millions.4 2 Others argue
that the American "pay-for-performance model" is immoral, rewards
greedy executives for company performance that is unrelated to an
executive's performance, allows executives to essentially set their own
compensation and enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders,
and causes significant economic harm.43 Although arguments for
both views exist (and the truth is probably somewhere in the middle),
38 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 140-41; Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 35,
at 300.
39 See Charles M. Yablon, Is the Market for CEOs Rational?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 89, 105
(2007) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3).
40 Id. at 112.
41 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 71-72.
42 KAY & VAN PUTrEN, supra note 1, at 1.
43 See id.
2010] 175
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
I conclude that there is a problem with the American model of execu-
tive compensation.
A. Arguments That No Executive-Compensation Problem Exists
Ira Kay and Steven Van Putten assert that no significant problems
exist with current executive-compensation practices. 4 4 Kay and Van
Putten marshal substantial amounts of data and conclude that CEOs
who perform well generally receive high and increasing amounts of
compensation because of the small, competitive market for top execu-
tives. 45 Recruiting talented executives certainly requires protecting
them from various risks, and those commentators who are satisfied
with current executive-compensation practices note that executives in
public companies do not have the authority or ability to control the
board of directors, which arguably decreases the risk of executives si-
phoning money from the corporation as salary. 46 Kay and Van Putten
also argue that this compensation system is an integral component of
the American corporate model-the same model that has created the
most productive economy in the world.4 7
Others who study executive-compensation practices conclude
that, despite some problems with the practices, these problems are
rather small and any attempt to change how executives are compen-
sated may actually worsen the situation.48 For instance, one study
found that the top five executives at American companies receive, on
average, between two and three percent of the value that the company
generates, leading to the conclusion that gains from altering execu-
tive-compensation practices "would be swamped by the resulting de-
cline in productivity, profitability . . . and the overall value of the
corporation." 49  Individuals arguing that executive-compensation
problems are insubstantial also claim that diverting resources to ad-
dress actual or perceived flaws distracts from more serious socioeco-
nomic issues.50
Nevertheless, even Kay and Van Putten admit that some execu-
tive-compensation problems deserve attention. They argue that exec-
utive-compensation practices would improve if companies reduced
44 See id. at 1-2. According to Kay and Van Putten, "like most mythologies, the cur-
rent conception of executive compensation distorts or exaggerates actual events. The my-
thology has too easily found larger-than-life examples of personal gain and sumptuous
lifestyles with no link to superior corporate performance." Id. at 2.
45 Id. at 2-3, 41; Simmons, supra note 7, at 314.
46 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999); see KAY & VAN
PUTrEN, supra note 1, at 143.
47 KAY & VAN PUrrEN, supra note 1, at 10, 181.
48 See Simmons, supra note 7, at 299-300, 303 ("[C]orporate lawmaker self-interest
and opportunism . . . can be a source of rent extraction, inefficiency, and welfare loss.").
49 KAY & VAN PUTrEN, supra note 1, at 4.
50 See Simmons, supra note 7, at 305-06, 364.
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severance packages, emphasized real stock ownership by executives,
and followed exemplary corporate governance practices throughout
the process of developing their compensation plans.5' Kay and Van
Putten also admit that excessive use of stock options can harm corpo-
rations by failing to adequately incentivize executives to perform
well. 52 They also believe that greater disclosure of executive-compen-
sation practices-particularly with regard to deferred compensation,
retirement plans, and severance-is important.53
B. Arguments That Corporations Should Address Any Problem
Themselves
Some argue that problems with executive compensation do exist
but that corporations should be responsible for solutions, with no role
for legislatures, the SEC, other regulatory agencies, or self-regulatory
organizations. 54 For example, shareholders could amend the com-
pany's bylaws or charter (depending on the laws of a jurisdiction and
the process that a company has adopted for amending its governance
documents) to create shareholder-advocate positions for supervising
executive-compensation practices.55 This approach, however, assumes
that executives and board directors have not altered the rules for
amending the governance documents to entrench themselves -and
limit the ability of shareholders to enact changes.56 Some scholars
argue that shareholders can overcome these limits by selling shares in
companies that have unfavorable practices and then investing in those
with more favorable practices.5 7 This argument assumes that variation
will exist among firms;5 8 however, as described below, variation is un-
likely because companies with similar structures will often confront
the same conflicts. Also, many investors are unable to sell their shares
any time they wish.59 Thus, if an executive-compensation problem
exists, corporations appear to be unable to solve it themselves.
51 KAY & VAN PUTrEN, supra note 1, at 5-6.
52 See id. at 6.
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Knutt, supra note 8, at 495.
55 See Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution to Excessive
CEO Pay, 72 BRooK. L. REv. 449, 473 (2007).
56 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 211 (discussing the entrenching effect of
staggered boards); Bebchuk, supra note 18, at 843-45 (discussing the limited ability of
shareholders to enact changes).
57 See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An
Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 569-70 (2001).
58 See KAY & VAN PUTTEN, supra note 1, at 88 (discussing different methods of compen-
sating executives).
59 See id.
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C. Arguments That an Executive-Compensation Problem Exists
Overall, there does appear to be a significant problem with exec-
utive compensation. Even those who do not believe that significant
executive-compensation problems exist will admit that "executive
compensation played a role in the decline in performance at some
companies" in the past.6 0 For instance, the excessive use of options at
some companies created an intense focus on the short term and even
led some executives to engage in fraud to boost the value of their
equity compensation. 61 More importantly, though, empirical studies
generally do not find a strong and persistent correlation between the
cash compensation of executives (salary and bonuses) and company
performance. 62
One common criticism of executive compensation is the "popu-
lism" critique. This critique, based on notions of "fairness" and "mo-
rality," abhors that a few individuals make incredible amounts of
money.63 According to this approach, the problem is not the process
that leads to executive-compensation decisions but the outcome it-
self.64 Some even argue that "anyone who makes that kind of money
must be doing something either illegal or immoral."65 Individuals
making this argument typically focus on the massive discrepancies be-
tween the compensation of top American executives and that of aver-
age American workers, foreign executives, lawyers, bankers, and other
professionals. 66 Nevertheless, this position relies on subjective notions
of what is "fair," which is difficult to quantify and apply, limiting the
utility of including it in discussions of reforming executive
compensation.
Additionally, paying an executive a large amount of money may
be completely rational. For example, if hiring a hypothetical execu-
tive would increase the value of a hypothetical company by $10 billion,
then paying this executive $1 billion, which seems excessive and "un-
fair," not only makes sense but may even constitute underpayment
from the executive's perspective, as he or she would not receive the
entire value that he or she created. Therefore, because of the limita-
60 See KAY & VAN PUrrEN, supra note 1, at 51.
61 See id.
62 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 122-23. A small correlation exists between com-
pensation and corporate performance in the 1980s, but no such correlation exists in either
the 1970s or the 1990s. Id.
63 See id. at 8.
64 See Mark A. Salky, Comment, The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive
Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither Necessary?, 49 U. MiAMi L. REv. 795, 797-98 (1995)
(distinguishing between "unfair price" and "unfair process" arguments that explain why
CEO compensation is excessive).
65 See id. at 797 (quoting Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set
CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1992, at 28, 29).
66 Id. at 797-800.
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tions of the populist critique, a preferable approach is to focus on the
flaws of the executive-compensation process (rather than its out-
comes) and evaluate the seriousness of the problems in terms of the
unrecognized shareholder benefits.
The stronger and more common critique of executive-compensa-
tion practices is the management-capture or management-power the-
ory. This theory treats board members as imperfect shareholder
agents who do not bargain with executives at "arm's-length" when de-
termining executive-compensation packages, and, thus enter into con-
tracts that favor executives over shareholders.6 7 Advocates of the
management-capture theory argue that directors have both financial
and nonfinancial reasons to favor executives.6 8 Numerous financial
scandals support this idea by highlighting instances of boards being
overly deferential to their executives, including the scandals at Adel-
phia, Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. 6 9
Several reasons account for the failure of boards and compensa-
tion committees to develop executive-compensation plans that are ef-
ficient in maximizing shareholder value. First, executives have
considerable influence on who will be on the company's slate of can-
didates for board elections, with those who appear on the company's
slate almost certain to be elected or reelected as directors.7 0 Accord-
ingly, challenging executives' compensation is not likely to either help
a director retain his or her board position or obtain positions on
other boards.7 1 Second, directors who frequently interact with execu-
tives-or who are (or were) executives themselves-will likely develop
beliefs that support high compensation levels for executives, as such
beliefs will help the director avoid the discomfort of arguing that the
compensation that executives receive is undeserved. 72 Third, execu-
tives can use their power and access to information to influence the
board.73
An additional reason that boards fail to develop efficient com-
pensation arrangements is their ability to "camouflage" executive-
compensation arrangements.74 The idea of camouflage is that the
recognition of compensation practices that are overly favorable to ex-
ecutives provides a check on excessive compensation, which gives ex-
67 See BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 3, at 3-4, 23, 123; Simmons, supra note 7, at
315-17. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 23-44 (arguing that directors do
not bargain at arm's length with executives).
68 See, e.g., BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 3, at 4-5, 23.
69 Paredes, supra note 20, at 679.
70 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 25-26.
71 See id. at 36.
72 See id. at 33.
73 Id. at 61-62.
74 See id. at 67.
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ecutives (and even directors) an incentive to obscure how a company
actually compensates its executives. 75 If a significant number of indi-
viduals recognize the flaws of a company's executive-compensation re-
gime, there will be both market costs, as individuals may be less likely
to invest in the company, and social costs, as individuals may view the
executives and directors as "greedy" and form negative views of the
executives and directors.76 Thus, perception appears to be a greater
constraint than reality.7 7
This notion of camouflage helps to explain why improving disclo-
sures is the key to improving executive-compensation practices. If
companies are forced to disclose all pertinent information related to
executive compensation in a concise and understandable form, the
ability of executives to obtain undeserved compensation will be con-
strained.78 Several different measures could help to accomplish this
goal, including statutory regulations, rule changes by self-regulating
organizations, and alterations of corporate bylaws or articles of incor-
poration.7 9 As discussed below, there have been several recent at-
tempts at reform, but the approach of Judge Rakoff presents an
efficient and relatively simple way to improve executive-compensation
practices.
III
RECENT ATTEMPTS To ADDRESS THE EXECUTIVE-
COMPENSATION PROBLEM
Legislators and regulators frequently link executive-compensa-
tion issues with broader economic difficulties.80 Accordingly, every
few years there is a spurt of proposals and legislation that address ex-
ecutive compensation. 8' Recent efforts to reform executive compen-
sation include changes in 1992 (which some refer to as "the year of
75 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI L. REV. 751, 756, 789 (2002)
("Accordingly, under the managerial power approach, managers will prefer compensation
structures and processes that enable the extraction of rents to be camouflaged as optimal
contracting. ... [O]utrage costs and constraints and the resulting camouflage motive
might explain why firms rely so heavily on compensation surveys and consultants.").
76 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 66-67; Bebchuk et al., supra note 75, at 770-71.
77 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 67.
78 Bebchuk et al., supra note 75, at 788 ("[W]hether significant outrage costs can be
expected to arise would depend on the extent to which rent extraction is clearly apparent
to outsiders, not just (or even mainly) upon how much rents are extracted.").
79 For a brief overview of different possible approaches, see Martin, supra note 28, at
528-29.
80 See Simmons, supra note 7, at 306.
81 See Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses-Again,
41 U.S.F. L. REV. 147, 147 (2006).
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the pay protest"8 2 ), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,83 the rules re-
garding executive-compensation disclosures that the SEC instituted in
2006,84 and congressional legislation proposed in 2009.85 The most
promising reform in terms of actually improving executive-compensa-
tion practices is the SEC's 2006 disclosure rules. Combining these dis-
closure rules with the enforcement practices that Judge Rakoffs
decision in SEC v. Bank of America Corp. suggests, which would require
that courts follow Judge Rakoff's approach when reviewing SEC en-
forcement actions, will noticeably improve executive-compensation
practices.
A. Reforms of 1992
In 1992, executive compensation emerged as an issue in the pres-
idential election.86 Bill Clinton, for instance, pledged to reform exec-
utive compensation.8 7 Additionally, members of Congress introduced
numerous bills aimed at reforming executive compensation, includ-
ing one that would give shareholders the right to propose executive-
compensation policies.88  Perhaps most importantly, however, the
SEC promulgated disclosure rules that required companies to present
executive-compensation information in a series of tables and a com-
mittee report.8 9 The SEC amended these rules in 2006 in an attempt
to make executive-compensation information easier to understand.90
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
In 2002, in response to numerous corporate scandals, Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.91 Although intended to address a
number of "problems" with American corporations, the Act mostly fo-
cused on companies' auditing practices.9 2 Sarbanes-Oxley federal-
ized numerous areas of corporate law, including provisions for
82 Id. at 148.
83 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
Tides 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 of the United States Code).
84 See Martin, supra note 81, at 149-50.
85 See discussion infra Part III.D.
86 Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV.
713, 713-14 (1995).
87 See Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive Compensation
Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. Rav. 41, 59 (2008).
88 Murphy, supra note 86, at 713-14, 728.
89 See id. at 731; see also Martin, supra note 28, at 492. Lucian Bebchuk andJesse Fried
note that these required disclosures decreased the ability of directors and executives to
camouflage executive compensation. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 67-68.
90 See Martin, supra note 81, at 150.
91 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
Titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 of the United States Code).
92 See BROWN, supra note 5, at 6-7; see also Knutt, supra note 8, at 509 ("The majority of
Sarbanes-Oxley is not dedicated to executive compensation issues . . . .").
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forfeiting executive pay, prohibiting loans from companies to execu-
tives, and mandating separation of accounting and auditing services. 93
Sarbanes-Oxley also makes executives certify certain information dis-
closures and, if the disclosed information later proves to be inaccurate
and the executives knew of the inaccuracies, the executives are legally
liable.9 4
C. SEC Disclosure Regulations of 2006
On January 27, 2006, the SEC proposed amending its rules regu-
lating the disclosure of executive-compensation information; when
the public comment period ended in April 2006, the SEC had re-
ceived over 20,000 comments-the most for any proposed rule in the
SEC's seventy-year history.95 Under the new rules, a company must
disclose the compensation that its CEO, Chief Financial Officer
(CFO), and three other highest-paid officers received during the fiscal
year.96 The goal of these rules was to increase transparency by provid-
ing investors with a more complete and clearer image of the compen-
sation of certain executives, not to dictate levels of compensation.97
Rather than list the information that a company must disclose, the
SEC disclosure rules are "principles based," meaning that they require
a company to report all forms of compensation unless the rules specif-
ically exempt it.98 The SEC also requires that companies provide a
"Compensation Discussion and Analysis" (CD&A), which must be writ-
ten in "plain English" and must describe the company's compensation
objectives, policies, and decision-making processes, as well as the role
that executives played in crafting the CD&A. 99 In brief, a company
must now explain how much compensation its top executives receive
and why.100
D. Legislation of 2009
In 2007 and 2008, as the SEC's new rules were going into effect,
the United States experienced a significant economic decline that was
part of a broader global financial crisis.' 01 In 2008, Henry Paulson,
the Secretary of the Treasury, confronted a number of failures of
93 See Knutt, supra note 8, at 510; Simmons, supra note 7, at 328.
94 See BROWN, supra note 5, at 25.
95 BORGES, supra note 5, at 8-9.
96 Id. at 23; BROWN, supra note 5, at 30.
97 See BROWN, supra note 5, at 3, 18.
98 BORGES, supra note 5, at 2, 34.
99 See id. at 45-47, 79.
100 Id. at 46; BROWN, supra note 5, at 3.
101 See Sarah H. Burghart, Survey, Overcompensating Much? The Impact of Preemption on
Emerging Federal and State Efforts to Limit Executive Compensation, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
669, 671.
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financial corporations and worked on drafting a bailout of the Ameri-
can banking industry.10 2 Even before these events culminated in con-
gressional action that provided hundreds of billions of dollars in aid
to firms having financial difficulties, a significant portion of the public
debate regarding the causes of the economic crisis involved claims
that executives were too highly paid.103
In the midst of this public debate, members of Congress intro-
duced a number of bills designed to reform corporate governance
and overhaul executive compensation. Two important bills aimed at
this purpose are the Excessive Pay Shareholder Approval Act' 04 (Ex-
cessive Pay Act), sponsored by Senator Richard Durbin, and the
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009105 (Bill of Rights Act), spon-
sored by Senators Charles Schumer and Maria Cantwell. The Exces-
sive Pay Act would require that a supermajority (sixty percent) of
shareholders vote to approve "excessive compensation," which the bill
defines as compensation that is greater than one hundred times the
compensation that the average employee receives.106 The Excessive
Pay Act would also require that proxy materials disclose the compen-
sation that the lowest-paid employee received, the average amount of
compensation all employees received, and the total amount of com-
pensation paid to employees making more than one hundred times
that average.107 After Senator Durbin introduced the Excessive Pay
Act on May 7, 2009, the Senate referred it to the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; 08 the committee has not
taken any action on the act.
Senators Schumer and Cantwell introduced the Bill of Rights Act
on May 19, 2009.109 The Bill of Rights Act would require that all pub-
licly traded companies permit shareholders to vote on a nonbinding
resolution either approving or disapproving executive-compensation
plans.1"0 The Bill of Rights Act would also: require that boards be
declassified (that is, federal law would prohibit staggered boards
whereby shareholders elect only a portion of directors each year, help-
ing incumbent directors and executives entrench themselves); man-
date the creation of corporate "risk committees" (composed entirely
102 Id. at 676.
103 Id. at 672.
104 S. 1006, 111th Cong. (2009).
105 S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009).
106 S. 1006; see David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Populists' Wish Lists Offer Legislative
Parade of Horribles, N.Y. L.J., July 23, 2009, at 5.
107 S. 1006.
108 Id.
109 S. 1074.
110 S. 1074. For a strong criticism of the Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, see
Martin Lipton, Jay W. Lorsch & Theodore N. Mirvis, Opinion, Schumer's Shareholder Bill
Misses the Mark, WAu. ST. J., May 12, 2009, at A15.
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of independent directors who would evaluate a company's risk-man-
agement practices); and permit shareholders to include their nomina-
tions for board seats in a company's proxy materials."' The Senate
referred the Bill of Rights Act to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs.' 12 Neither the Senate nor the committee
has taken any action. Thus, the recent legislative efforts do not ap-
pear very promising. Still, other means for addressing executive-com-
pensation problems remain.
IV
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY SHAREHOLDERS To ADDRESS THE
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION PROBLEM
Before discussing Judge Rakof's decision and reasoning in SEC v.
Bank of America Corp. and how this approach, if combined with the
SEC regulations enacted in 1992 and 2006, could effectively address
current executive-compensation problems, it is worthwhile to discuss
one other possible method of resolving executive-compensation
problems: shareholder derivative actions. As discussed below, this ap-
proach is not likely to succeed and has several flaws that make it
undesirable.
Historically, shareholders have often used derivative actions to
challenge executive-compensation practices.113 Generally, to prevail
in a derivative suit challenging executive compensation, a shareholder
suing on behalf of the company must demonstrate either that the di-
rectors who crafted the executive-compensation plan were engaged in
unacceptable self-dealing or that the executive compensation is so
egregious that it constitutes "waste," which generally requires that the
shareholder prove that a rational person would not have approved the
compensation.1 14 An early case that established a role for such share-
holder suits is Rogers v. Hill.115 In Rogers, the plaintiffs-shareholders
of the American Tobacco Company-sought to recover bonuses that
American Tobacco paid to its top executives. 116 The Supreme Court
Ill S. 1074; see Lipton et al., supra note 110. Eliminating staggered corporate boards
would likely increase shareholder power. The concept of the "market for corporate con-
trol" is based on the idea that a poorly run firm will have a low share price, which will make
it vulnerable to takeovers by those who recognize the potential gains from a more effec-
tively run company. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 55. Staggered boards prevent hos-
tile acquirers from gaining control for more than one year, and many would-be hostile
acquirers will not attempt to acquire a company with a staggered board due to the ex-
tended time commitment. See id.
112 S. 1074.
i 13 Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) ofExecu-
tive Pay, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 233, 265 (2004).
114 Hawkins, supra note 55, at 455.
115 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
116 See id. at 583, 590; Knutt, supra note 8, at 493-94.
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determined that, even though American Tobacco properly enacted its
executive-compensation plan, courts could still review its compensa-
tion scheme to determine whether the compensation scheme was un-
reasonable or constituted corporate waste. 117
Although Rogers established that courts can review executive-com-
pensation practices via derivative suits, shareholders rarely succeed in
such challenges.118 Courts are hesitant to tell companies how much
they should pay their executives because of the general belief that
'judges are not competent to decide what business executives are
worth." 119 Thus, to prevail, the shareholder-plaintiffs must meet an
extremely high burden.120 Under Delaware law, for instance, if a com-
pany's board of directors (1) has no personal interest in its executive-
compensation recommendations, (2) sufficiently investigates and dis-
cusses compensation proposals, and (3) relies on the advice of outside
consultants, its decisions will be protected by the "business judgment
rule," which is extremely deferential to board decisions. 121
The most recent significant decision involving shareholder deriv-
ative actions challenging executive compensation is Brehm v. Eisner (In
re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation).122 The case involved the
brief tenure of Michael Ovitz as the President of Disney.123 In 1995,
Ovitz entered into an agreement with Disney to serve for five years; in
December 1996, just fourteen months after he started, Disney termi-
nated Ovitz without cause, thereby triggering the severance-package
provision of the agreement that required Disney pay Ovitz approxi-
mately $130 million. 124 In 1997, several Disney shareholders brought
derivative actions against Ovitz and Disney's directors in the Delaware
Court of Chancery. 125 The Court of Chancery ruled that, although
Ovitz received $130 million for fourteen months of work, this pay-
ment did not satisfy the "high hurdle required to establish waste," as
the high pay was meant to entice Ovitz to leave his previous company
and work for Disney.126 The Court of Chancery found that, despite
some flaws in the board's and compensation committee's procedures,
117 See Rogers, 289 U.S. at 591-92; Knutt, supra note 8, at 493-94.
118 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 75, at 779.
119 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999).
120 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 75, at 780; Simmons, supra note 7, at 311 n.40.
121 See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN.
L. REv. 649, 685 (1995).
122 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
123 Martin, supra note 28, at 497.
124 In re The Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 35; Martin, supra note 28, at 497.
125 See In re The Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 35 ("The plaintiffs claimed that the
$130 million severance payout was the product of fiduciary duty and contractual breaches
by Ovitz, and breaches of fiduciary duty by the Disney defendants, and a waste of assets.").
126 Id. at 75.
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the process did not violate the directors' duty of care.1 27 The Dela-
ware Supreme Court affirmed, though it did note that fiduciary du-
ties, good faith requirements, and corporate waste theories apply to
executive-compensation practices.12 8 Still, the case shows that, gener-
ally, courts will review a board's procedures, not the size of its execu-
tive-compensation packages.129
Given the hostility of courts to derivative actions, this approach is
simply not likely to reform problematic executive-compensation prac-
tices. Even if courts were amenable to shareholder derivative actions,
relying on individual shareholders to challenge executive-compensa-
tion practices would cause a significant problem. A rational share-
holder is unlikely to incur massive litigation costs if all shareholders,
including those who are passive, will share any recovery. Thus, a dif-
ferent approach is necessary to address executive-compensation
problems.
ANALYSIS
V
SEC ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES
Rather than legislative changes or private legal action, govern-
ment enforcement of existing executive-compensation rules can ad-
dress current executive-compensation issues. In this Part, I argue that
an effective way to ameliorate executive-compensation problems is for
courts to police the SEC in its enforcement of SEC disclosure rules.
An alternative to private suits challenging executive compensa-
tion is government enforcement of executive-compensation rules and
regulations. Throughout the twentieth century, the American admin-
istrative state grew significantly, with this "headless fourth branch of
government" shaping and implementing the regulatory scheme that
largely governs executive compensation.13 0 The most important gov-
ernment agency in terms of regulating executive compensation is the
SEC. Since its creation in the early twentieth century, the SEC has
focused on ensuring that companies disclose accurate information to
markets and investors.13' Although the SEC does not review the sub-
stance of executive compensation, it promotes transparency by mak-
ing shareholders aware of and thus more likely to address improper
executive compensation, in turn reducing the ability of executives to
127 Id. at 56.
128 Martin, supra note 28, at 488-89.
129 See id.
130 See Burghart, supra note 101, at 702; see also id. at 674.
131 Martin, supra note 28, at 512-13.
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obtain compensation packages that favor themselves over
shareholders.132
In recent years, the SEC has proceeded against numerous compa-
nies that failed to disclose information regarding executive compensa-
tion. For example, in 2004, prior to the 2006 rule changes, the SEC
attempted to enforce then-existing disclosure requirements against
General Electric (GE) for "failing to fully and adequately describe the
'terms and conditions' of its retirement agreement with its former
CEO Jack Welch."1 3 3 The SEC also filed a complaint against, and
eventually settled with, Tyson Foods for Tyson's failure to adequately
disclose the value of the perquisites that its chairman received. 3 4
In its enforcement actions against public companies, the SEC at-
tempts to deter corporate misbehavior without harming innocent
shareholders. 135 Nevertheless, the SEC settles a vast majority of its
cases.' 36 When the SEC settles a case involving executive-compensa-
tion disclosures, it generally settles with the company rather than with
particular board members, executives, or consultants. 3 7 Thus, the
settlement payment comes from the corporation, which belongs to
the shareholders, with the underlying rationale being that sharehold-
ers will be more vigilant and can take appropriate action. 3 8 Taking
action against the corporation itself is also easier in terms of the bur-
den that the SEC must satisfy to prevail.' 39 John Coffee argues that
the emphasis on settlements has created a culture of dysfunction at
the SEC and makes the SEC appear more powerful than it actually
is.140
132 See id. at 523.
133 See KAY & VAN PUTrEN, supra note 1, at 52.
134 See id.
135 See Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support
of Entry of the Proposed ConsentJudgment at 16, SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp.
2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-CV-6829) [hereinafter Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff].
136 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The End of Phony Deterrence? "SEC v. Bank of America," N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 17, 2009, at 5.
137 See Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff, supra note 135, at 2-3 (discussing the SEC's
penalties policy, which may require a corporation-but not individuals-to pay a penalty).
138 See id. at 13, 16.
139 For example, some sections of the Exchange Act, such as Section 14(a) and Rule
14a-9, have no scienter requirement. See Memorandum of Plaintiff Securities & Exchange
Commission in Support of Entry of the Proposed Consent Judgment at 19, Bank of Am.
Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (No. 09-CV-6829) [hereinafter Memorandum of Plaintiff]. If,
however, the SEC brought enforcement actions against individuals in a 10(b) proceeding
(a provision for charging an individual with fraud), the SEC could succeed only if it could
prove that the individuals did not believe, in good faith, that the information was not
inaccurate or misleading. See id. at 24-25.
140 Coffee, supra note 136, at 1. Still, Coffee notes that the combination of the SEC's
policies of settling most cases and carefully choosing issues to litigate provides general
deterrence at a relatively low cost. Id.
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Courts have historically been extremely deferential to the SEC's
determination of whether a settlement is in the public interest.14 1 Ad-
ditionally, courts have routinely protected the executive-compensa-
tion decisions that informed directors make in good faith and without
self-interest. 14 2 This protection has led some commentators to con-
clude that courts are unable (or unwilling) to address the problems
associated with executive compensation.14 3 Nevertheless, the SEC's
2006 disclosure rules are unlikely to affect executive-compensation
practices unless these rules are vigorously enforced. Every time the
SEC or Congress implements new rules to increase transparency in
executive compensation, corporations create new ways to avoid dis-
closing this information. 1 4 4 The SEC's new regulations seem able to
avoid this problem by making disclosure the default position, but the
SEC still must ensure that companies disclose all required information
accurately. Accordingly, the SEC must actively enforce these new
rules, and this enforcement will necessarily involve the courts. Com-
mentators have argued that " [p]ublic officials and governance reform-
ers . . . should work to ensure that compensation arrangements are
and remain transparent."145 A case that demonstrates how courts can
effectively police SEC enforcement to ensure that the SEC effectively
addresses executive-compensation problems is SEC v. Bank of America
Corp.1
46
VI
SEC v. BANK OF AMERICA CoRp.
On first impression, Judge Rakoff's decision in SEC v. Bank of
America Corp. does not appear to have a connection to executive-com-
pensation regulation. In SEC v. Bank ofAmerica Corp., the SEC alleged
that Bank of America misled investors about the billions of dollars
Bank of America paid to former Merrill Lynch employees after Bank
of America acquired Merrill Lynch. 1 4 7 The SEC and Bank of America
proposed a settlement, butJudge Rakoff denied it.148 Judge Rakoff is
141 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987); SEC v.
Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1984); SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431,
436 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Bank of America Corp. at 30, Bank
of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (No. 09-CV-6829).
142 See Katz & Mcintosh, supra note 106, at 4.
143 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 45-46.
144 Martin, supra note 81, at 153.
145 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 193.
146 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
147 Id. at 508.
148 Id.; David Ellis, judge Rejects Merrill Bonus Settlement: Bank of America and the SEC Are
Told That a Proposed $33 Million Penalty over Merrill Lynch Bonuses Is "Neither Fair, Nor Reasona-
ble, Nor Adequate, "CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 14, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/14/
new/companies/bofa-sec/index.htm.
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known as a maverick, and he previously inserted himself into corpo-
rate governance matters at WorldCom and has required the release of
private documents in previous settlements.' 4 9 After discussing the
facts of SEC v. Bank of America Corp. and Judge Rakoffs innovative ap-
proach below, I then explain how his reasoning can help improve the
SEC's enforcement of executive-compensation regulations.
A. Facts of SEC v. Bank of America Corp.
In September 2008, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch negoti-
ated a merger. 15 0 The parties negotiated the principal terms of this
transaction on September 13 and 14, and a major topic of discussion
was whether to pay significant 2008 bonuses to Merrill Lynch employ-
ees and corporate officers in accordance with its discretionary bonus
program.15 1 Bank of America, which was essentially acquiring Merrill
Lynch, agreed to allow Merrill Lynch to pay its employees and officers
bonuses of up to $5.8 billion, with the only additional restraint being
that Merrill Lynch had to consult Bank of America before making any
final decisions about the form of the bonuses.152 Bank of America
and Merrill Lynch executed a merger agreement on September 15,
2008, publicly announcing the merger that morning. 53 On Novem-
ber 3, 2008, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch solicited shareholder
support for the merger with a joint proxy statement. 5 4
According to the SEC, Bank of America indicated that Merrill
Lynch agreed not to pay discretionary bonuses to its employees and
officers without Bank of America's consent (implying that bonuses
were unlikely), even though Bank of America had agreed that Merrill
Lynch could pay substantial bonuses. 15 5 Several weeks after the
merger, the value of shares of Bank of America dropped substantially,
as Merrill Lynch's losses in 2008 were greater than anticipated.' 5 6
The SEC subsequently charged Bank of America with making ma-
terially false and misleading statements in the joint proxy state-
ment.15 7 Bank of America argued that the shareholders had not been
misled, that the proxy statement did not contain false or misleading
statements, that the disclosures were consistent with common merger-
149 Louise Story, Openness Is Crucial to Merrill Case, Judge Says: "Legitimacy of the Courts"
Demands Transparency in Bonus Decision, He Says, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 25, 2009, Lexis-
Nexis Academic.
150 Complaint at 4-5, SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(No. 09-CV-6829).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 5.
153 Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Bank of America Corp., supra note 141, at 4.
154 Complaint, supra note 150, at 1-2.
155 See id. at 2.
156 Orey, supra note 11, at 1-2.
157 See Complaint, supra note 150, at 1; see also Ellis, supra note 148.
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disclosure practices, and that shareholders could have found relevant
information from a variety of sources (particularly the media).15 8
Nevertheless, the same day that the SEC brought these charges, the
SEC and Bank of America proposed a settlement, which they submit-
ted to a federal district court for approval.15 9 This settlement would
have enjoined Bank of America from making false statements in proxy
solicitations and required Bank of America to pay a $33 million pen-
alty to the SEC.160 Bank of America, which neither denied nor admit-
ted the charges, still asserted that the proxy statement, if analyzed
closely and carefully, was not misleading, and that any misstatements
were immaterial because shareholders had access to the information
from other readily available sources.' 6 '
B. Reasoning of SEC v. Bank of America Corp.
Judge Rakoff, sitting in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, heard oral argument on the proposed
settlement on August 10, 2009, and he received numerous written sub-
missions in August and September. 162 Judge Rakoff refused to ap-
prove the settlement, concluding that, even under the most
deferential standard of review, the settlement was "neither fair, nor
reasonable, nor adequate." 163 He stated that the notion that the
shareholders of Bank of America, who may have been misled in ap-
proving a merger with a nearly bankrupt company, would have to lose
an additional $33 million to be motivated to better monitor and assess
the company's executives was "absurd."16 4 Judge Rakoff noted that
the practice of forcing a company that violates securities laws to pay a
penalty essentially means that the victims of the violation pay an addi-
tional penalty, which seems inappropriate.' 65 Furthermore, because
158 See Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff, supra note 135, at 1-2; Reply Memorandum of
Law on Behalf of Bank of America Corp. at 1, SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d
507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-CV-6829). According to one of Bank of America's experts,
more than 1200 news articles and publications discussed the merger between its proposal
in September 2008 and shareholder approval in December 2008; this expert concluded
that none of those media reports reasonably implied that Merrill Lynch would not pay
bonuses. Affidavit ofJoseph A. Grundfest at 15-16, SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp.
2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-CV-6829). Additionally, Bank of America noted that Mer-
rill Lynch disclosed in its financial statements that it had compensation-related expenses of
approximately $3.5 billion each quarter. Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Bank of
America Corp., supra note 141, at 1; Reply Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Bank of
America Corp., supra, at 7-8.
159 Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
160 Id. at 508; Memorandum of Plaintiff, supra note 139, at 1.
161 See Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 509; Memorandum of Law on Behalf of
Bank of America Corp., supra note 141, at 1.
162 See Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
163 Id. at 509.
164 See id.
165 Id. at 508, 512.
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the company was responsible for the penalty, paying it would not de-
ter those truly responsible for misleading the shareholders. 166
Judge Rakoff was concerned that the SEC did not pursue charges
against those truly responsible for the violation-particularly the exec-
utives of Bank of America and the lawyers who allegedly prepared the
misleading statements.167 He also asked why the SEC did not insist
that Bank of America waive the attorney-client privilege if it wished to
argue that it merely relied on counsel.168 In the past, Judge Rakoff
has drawn on his experience as prosecutor to note unfortunate
changes in enforcement practices. According to Rakoff, when he was
a prosecutor in a securities-fraud unit many years ago, law enforce-
ment put greater accountability on executives, usually filing charges
against the people responsible for violations rather than against whole
companies.169 Rakoff decided that the settlement proposal "was a
contrivance designed to provide the [SEC] with the faCade of enforce-
ment" while giving the executives at Bank of America "a quick resolu-
tion of an embarrassing inquiry ... at the expense of the sole alleged
victims, the shareholders."1 7 0
VII
IMPLICATIONS OF SEC v. BANK OF AMERICA CORP. AND
COURTS' POLICING OF SEC ENFORCEMENT
Judge Rakoff's approach in rejecting the settlement is different
from the approach that judges have taken in many similar cases, 171
and its adoption by other judges would have numerous ramifications.
In terms of executive-compensation practices, the ramifications have
the potential to be especially significant. In SEC v. Bank of America
Corp., the SEC did not prosecute Bank of America because it paid bo-
nuses to former Merrill Lynch employees; rather, the SEC alleged that
Bank of America failed to disclose the bonus arrangements to its
shareholders.1 7 2 As noted above, the key mechanism for protecting
shareholders from unfair executive-compensation practices is trans-
parency, and a leading cause of unfair and inefficient compensation
166 See id. at 512.
167 See id. at 511.
168 Louise Story, Scrutiny for S.E.C. in Merrill Bonuses, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 2009, at B1.
169 Story, supra note 149. Even SEC policies state that the SEC should bring charges
against responsible individuals where possible. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 510;
Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff, supra note 135, at 3 ("Of course, the [SEC] will vigorously
pursue individual charges where supported by the evidence and the law. The [SEC] is
firmly committed to pursuing charges and the full scope of relief against individuals in
such circumstances.").
170 Bank ofAm. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
171 See Steven Pearlstein, What Kind ofJudge Stands Up for Truth and justice?, WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 2009, at A16.
172 See Memorandum of Plaintiff, supra note 139, at 3.
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practices is the ability of boards of directors and executives to "camou-
flage" executive compensation.17 3 The 2006 SEC disclosure rules,
however, establish the broad principle that a corporation must dis-
close all executive-compensation information, with only a few specific
exemptions.174 Accordingly, imagining future SEC enforcement ac-
tions that resemble the situation in SEC v. Bank of America Corp. is not
difficult. To be sure, the SEC must be willing to challenge the suffi-
ciency of executive-compensation disclosures, which is admittedly un-
certain, but nothing indicates that the SEC will be reluctant to enforce
its new rules, particularly as executive compensation receives increas-
ing political and media attention. If courts adopt Judge Rakoff's ap-
proach and require that the SEC focus on those responsible for
disclosure failures and camouflaging compensation regimes, share-
holders will be better protected, reducing or even eliminating many of
the executivercompensation problems identified above.
A. Applying Judge Rakoff's Reasoning to Executive-
Compensation Disclosures
Admittedly, SEC v. Bank of America Corp. only tangentially relates
to executive compensation. Still, the central focus in the case was the
allegation that Bank of America failed to accurately disclose the bonus
arrangements to which it agreed.175 Similarly, a frequently discussed
problem with executive compensation is the lack of accurate disclo-
sures. 7 6 Thus, Judge Rakoff's requiring that the SEC break out of its
past practices in regulating proxy disclosures has the potential to pro-
foundly affect the SEC's regulation of executive-compensation
disclosures.
As noted above, the SEC's 2006 rules, which amended the 1992
rules concerning executive compensation, require that a company dis-
close all forms of executive compensation not specifically ex-
empted.177 To address current executive-compensation problems,
however, the SEC must also enforce the rules in a manner that is con-
sistent with the principles of the rules and regulations, meaning that it
must review the executive-compensation disclosures that companies
make, investigate to determine if they are accurate, and bring charges
if a company fails to fully and accurately disclose its executive-compen-
sation practices (and the reasons for these practices) in a comprehen-
sible manner.
173 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
175 Memorandum of Plaintiff, supra note 139, at 3.
176 See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 75, at 754-58 (discussing how managers may
obscure compensation schemes to avoid investor outrage).
177 See BORGEs, supra note 5, at 2.
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If the SEC continues to follow its pre-SEC v. Bank ofAmerica Corp.
operating practices, the 2006 rules are unlikely to have a significant
effect. For example, one can imagine a hypothetical situation resem-
bling SEC v. Bank of Ameica Corp. where the troubling behavior at is-
sue is a company's failure to comply with the SEC's executive-
compensation disclosure regulations. If the SEC behaved as it did in
SEC v. Bank ofAmerica Corp. (that is, simply charging the company with
violating the 2006 regulations and negotiating a settlement with the
company as a penalty), the 2006 rules would be unlikely to have much
effect. Of course, a company and its board would rather not pay a
penalty, but they might prefer paying a penalty to complying with the
executive-compensation disclosure rules. If executives truly do have a
significant influence over the board-and it appears they do 78-the
ability of executives to earn higher levels of compensation than they
would if they accurately disclosed the company's executive-compensa-
tion practices could more than compensate (from the executives' per-
spective) for payment of any penalties. Also, as SEC v. Bank of America
Corp. demonstrates, the company would pay the penalty,179 so the ben-
efits of noncompliance with SEC regulations would accrue to the ex-
ecutives, while shareholders would bear the burden of noncompliance
in the form of the company's losses.
This problematic approach certainly seems to be a logical out-
growth of the SEC's settlement culture. Many companies likely would
not fully comply with SEC regulations; as a result, the SEC would be
able to select a few targets, and-instead of engaging in a lengthy in-
vestigation that would uncover why the company failed to disclose its
executive-compensation practices-would negotiate with the com-
pany to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Thus, the SEC would
appear to be enforcing its rules and regulations while avoiding (and
hiding) the true extent of the problem.180 Because the SEC would
not hold individuals personally accountable, and because limited re-
sources means that the SEC could not pursue every violator, directors
and executives could continue to camouflage executive-compensation
packages and practices.
An alternative manner of enforcing the 2006 regulations would
follow the outline that Judge Rakoff presents in SEC v. Bank of America
Corp.181 First, the SEC would have to investigate whether a company
violated the 2006 regulations. Accordingly, the SEC would review the
company's required executive-compensation disclosure to make sure
that it accurately reported the compensation of the CEO, CFO, and
178 See supra notes 67-68, 70-73 and accompanying text.
179 See 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
180 See Coffee, supra note 136.
181 See supra notes 148-49, 163-70 and accompanying text.
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the three next-highest-paid directors.18 2 The SEC would also have to
review the CD&A to ensure that the company truthfully disclosed (in
plain English) its executive-compensation policies and objectives, as
well as the reasoning behind these policies and objectives.183
Second, if the SEC found that the company failed to comply with
the disclosure requirements, the SEC would investigate further to dis-
cover who is responsible for this failure. This approach is superior to
merely forcing the company to pay a penalty, as it avoids having the
shareholder-victims pay an additional penalty for their victimiza-
tion.184 An investigation may not be easy, but it would potentially
force those responsible for harming shareholders to bear the full cost
of their actions, which would almost certainly improve deterrence.
The SEC could focus its investigation on the compensation commit-
tee, the entire board, perhaps the executives, and even the consul-
tants (including lawyers) who advised the board.'85
The final step in this enforcement process would be to bring
charges against those responsible for failing to properly disclose exec-
utive-compensation information. The SEC could embrace its prefer-
ence for settlements at this point and negotiate a settlement with the
responsible individuals.18 6
In addition to any financial penalties that those responsible for
failing to comply with executive-compensation regulations receive,
nonlegal sanctions might even be more likely to deter inappropriate
behavior in the future. For example, a finding that an individual was
responsible for a company's failure to comply with SEC regulations
would expose the individual as disingenuous, thereby affecting the in-
dividual's future prospects and potentially threatening any position
that the individual currently holds. Also, the ensuing guilt and public
embarrassment would provide additional punishment that would oth-
erwise not be available if the SEC pursued the company rather than
the responsible individuals.187 Shame can be very useful for both pun-
182 See BORGES, supra note 5, at 23.
183 See id. at 45-47.
184 Cf Bank ofAm. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
185 In SEC v. Bank of America Corp., Bank of America relied on Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen
& Katz, while Shearman & Sterling LLP represented Merrill Lynch. Memorandum of Law
on Behalf of Bank of America Corp., supra note 141, at 4. Judge Rakoff specifically indi-
cated that lawyers could be held liable for a company's violation of the law by creating false
and misleading proxy statements. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 510-11.
186 A risk that the company might attempt to indemnify those responsible for violating
executive-compensation disclosure rules exists, but crafting an appropriate response to this
problem would not be difficult. For instance, the SEC could craft a rule stating that a
corporate policy indemnifying individuals responsible for a company's failing to comply
with executive-compensation disclosures violates public policy and is, accordingly,
unenforceable.
187 Sandeep Gopalan, Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 757,
757-59 (2007).
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ishing corporate rule breakers and deterring those who could be held
liable. 188
The process thatJudge Rakoffs reasoning suggests is particularly
suited to executive compensation, as existing regulations are well
crafted and a trend is emerging toward holding individual executives
and directors responsible for ensuring the accuracy of disclosures.
For instance, Sarbanes-Oxley already requires that CEOs and CFOs
reimburse their company for any bonuses that the company has paid
them if the company had to prepare an accounting restatement due
to misconduct in reporting its financial information.' 89 The SEC's
2006 executive-compensation regulations extended this trend by
adding that the company must certify its CD&A disclosure in accor-
dance with Sarbanes-Oxley requirements. 190 Thus, the notion of in-
dividual responsibility in executive compensation is already stronger
than notions of individual responsibility in the merger context that
Judge Rakoff addressed.
Additionally, the SEC will very likely be able to demonstrate that
directors, executives, or consultants violated SEC regulations, as a
company must disclose its reasons and principles for its executive-
compensation practices.191 This disclosure will also address the
management-capture theory and other assertions that executives can
easily influence boards and compensation committees. If the com-
pany does not disclose the true reasons for its plan, then those who
prepared the CD&A, and those who advised them, would be liable.
Accordingly, the SEC could follow Judge Rakoffs approach and
pursue executives and directors at companies that seem to have inade-
quately disclosed reasons for their executive-compensation practices.
For example, the SEC could prosecute a company that set its CEO's
compensation at a certain level because it wanted the CEO to be paid
more than the average CEO. If this desire affected the board's deci-
sions and the CD&A did not discuss this, then the SEC has a strong
case against the company, those who prepared the executive-compen-
sation package, those who prepared the CD&A, and perhaps even the
consultants who advised the individuals who crafted the compensation
package. If executives played a role in shaping executive compensa-
tion and this role was not disclosed, then the SEC would have a strong
case against those responsible for failing to disclose the executives'
influence. The SEC could also be very effective in requiring compa-
nies to accurately disclose how much the company's top executives
188 Id.
189 See BORGES, supra note 5, at 68 (discussing the implications of 15 U.S.C. § 7243
(2006)).
190 BROWN, supra note 5, at 3-4.
191 Id. at 3.
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actually earn-including salary, bonuses, deferred compensation,
pensions, perquisites, and any gratuitous payments-which would
limit the ability of executives to unfairly hide their actual compensa-
tion. 192 The elimination of executive-compensation camouflage
would allow investors to more clearly understand how much execu-
tives earn, and investors could influence the company by either voic-
ing their "outrage" or by considering this information when voting.193
SEC enforcement actions in accordance with Judge Rakoffs reasoning
might not eliminate all problems with executive compensation, but
they could address many of them.
B. How Courts Can Police SEC Enforcement of Executive-
Compensation Disclosures
As previously noted, the SEC enforcement approach that Judge
Rakoff's reasoning in SEC v. Bank ofAmerica Corp. suggests differs from
the SEC's current enforcement practices. A major factor that has con-
tributed to the SEC's focus on settlements is that courts generally de-
fer to the SEC in situations where the SEC recommends a proposed
settlement.194 In the past few years, courts have approved thousands
of SEC settlements resembling the SEC-Bank of America settle-
ment.195 Even Judge Rakoff recognized that courts deferentially re-
view the SEC's settlement proposals.1 9 6 Still, Judge Rakoff's decision
provides an example of how courts can ensure that the SEC pursues
enforcement actions against individuals who are responsible for inad-
equate disclosure of executive-compensation information.
Some scholars have argued that courts are not capable of address-
ing the problems of executive compensation.19 7 Additionally, as previ-
ously noted, many judges are skeptical as to whether courts are
capable of policing executive-compensation practices. 198 These be-
liefs are likely based on fears that courts would be reviewing the sub-
stance of executive compensation and whether the amount is
"reasonable," "fair," or complies with some other vague, subjective
concept that would be both difficult to apply consistently and beyond
the competence of the average judge.199
192 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 75, at 756.
193 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 65-66.
194 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
195 See Pearlstein, supra note 171; see also Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Bank of
America Corp., supra note 141, at 30 (citing examples of settlements involving the SEC that
received deferential review).
196 See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
197 See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 45.
198 See, e.g., Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999).
199 See id. at 838-39; see also In re QuVIS, Inc., No. 09-10706, 2009 WL 4262077, at *4-5
(Bankr. D. Kan. Nov. 23, 2009) (applying the business judgment rule to uphold a salary
proposal); Brehm v. Eisner (In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27,
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Judge Rakoff's reasoning demonstrates how courts can police ex-
ecutive compensation while avoiding these problems. If courts em-
braced Judge Rakoff's ideas, they would not review the compensation
that an executive receives; instead, review would involve whether the
SEC identified the appropriate parties to prosecute and, perhaps, the
extent to which a company's disclosures were inaccurate. If a court
reviewing the SEC's actions determined that the SEC was trying to
achieve a quick settlement while not pursuing thoroughly the alleged
failure to accurately and fully disclose executive-compensation infor-
mation, the court would not permit the SEC to settle. Faced with this
possibility, the SEC would almost certainly alter its practices in a way
that more effectively addresses executive-compensation problems.
Thus, as SEC v. Bank ofAmerica Corp. indicates, courts can play a role in
addressing the current problems of executive compensation.
C. Risks of Judge Rakoffs Approach
Although SEC v. Bank of America Corp. presents a scheme that
could address executive-compensation problems, Judge Rakoffis ap-
proach also presents certain risks that could undermine or eliminate
the benefits of the approach. In SEC v. Bank of America Corp., Joseph
A. Grundfest, a law professor and former SEC commissioner, provided
the court with an affidavit explaining why Judge Rakoff should ap-
prove the proposed settlement.200 Although many reasons that
Grundfest provided involve notions of convenience and benefits for
the company, he also discussed other possible ramifications of not ap-
proving the settlement proposal, including massive litigation costs and
distraction from other activities. 201 If courts require that the SEC con-
duct costly investigations and focus on individuals, SEC officers and
employees would have to divert more resources to these investiga-
tions, potentially limiting the SEC's ability to perform its other regula-
tory activities. The SEC might also have to pursue fewer cases, as
determining responsibility for improperly disclosing executive-com-
74-75 (Del. 2006) (discussing the "onerous standard" for showing corporate waste);
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d
1049, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("Whether [an] expenditure was wise or foolish, low risk or
high risk is of no concern to this Court."); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684
(Mich. 1919) (stating candidly that "judges are not business experts"); Sandfield v. Gold-
stein, 308 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29-30 (App. Div. 1970) ("The amount of compensation to be paid
corporate officers is properly a matter for the business judgment of the board of direc-
tors."); Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn't a Rule-The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL.
U. L. REv. 631, 637-38 (2002) (discussing policy rationales behind the business judgment
rule); Kay Xixi Ng, Inside the Boardroom: A Proposal to Delaware's Good Faith Jurisprudence to
Improve Board Passivity, 6 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 393, 420-21 (2008); Julian Velasco,
Shareholder Ownership and Pimacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 954-55.
200 Affidavit of Joseph A. Grundfest, supra note 158.
201 See id. at 19-20.
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pensation information could prove difficult. Additionally, companies,
corporate executives, and directors will very likely have some defenses.
In SEC v. Bank of America Corp., Bank of America claimed that it had
"powerful defenses."202 This prospect is not extremely problematic,
however, as companies, executives, and directors with strong, valid de-
fenses should not be coerced into forgoing these defenses and settling
simply to avoid a hassle.
Several positions that the SEC took in SEC v. Bank ofAmerica Corp.
could also hinder the ability of the SEC to pursue, in future enforce-
ment actions, individuals who allegedly violate disclosure laws. 2 03 The
SEC claimed that the facts of SEC v. Bank of America Corp. were not
sufficient to pursue culpable executives and directors, as the individu-
als otherwise responsible relied on consultants and other experts. 204
This argument is not particularly troublesome, however, because the
SEC could pursue consultants, executives, and officers to determine
the extent to which these individuals are culpable. In SEC v. Bank of
America Corp., the SEC also argued that it would have the burden of
proving that those it charged intended to deceive, defraud, or manip-
ulate information, or that they acted recklessly, and the SEC claimed
that these elements are difficult to establish.205 If the SEC is correct,
courts might force the SEC to embark on many difficult battles that
the SEC will likely lose.
The SEC, however, appears to be exaggerating the problems it
would face if forced to follow Judge Rakoffs reasoning in executive-
compensation enforcement actions. As noted above, the 2006 regula-
tions of executive-compensation disclosures are well worded, and
proving a violation is thus not likely to be difficult. Additionally, as
the academic literature concerning executive compensation is vast
and sophisticated, the SEC would have a variety of options for present-
ing reasons why executives and directors made certain executive-com-
pensation decisions. Furthermore, even if the SEC is correct in its
claims about the burden that it would have to satisfy in future prosecu-
tions, nothing indicates that it could not prove intent to deceive, de-
fraud, or manipulate information, or that certain executives or
directors acted recklessly.
Events that occurred after Judge Rakoff rejected the settlement
proposal in SEC v. Bank of America Corp. indicate that the SEC can
adapt to his approach. For example, Bank of America cooperated
with the SEC by providing more information and waiving attor-
202 Memorandum of Law on Behalf of Bank of America Corp., supra note 141, at 2-3.
203 See Coffee, supra note 136, at 5.
204 Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff, supra note 135, at 2-3; Memorandum of Plaintiff,
supra note 139, at 23-24.
205 See Memorandum of Plaintiff, supra note 139, at 24-25.
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ney-client privilege. 206 This indicates that the SEC retained a strong
position. If Bank of America believed that the SEC could not satisfy its
burden, the company would have had no reason to cooperate. Also,
the SEC did not abandon the enforcement action, which indicates
that the SEC is not entirely pessimistic about its ability to prevail in
similar Suits. 2 0 7
D. Advantages of Judge Rakoffs Approach
The scheme thatJudge Rakof's approach suggests has several ad-
vantages over other possibilities for addressing executive-compensa-
tion problems. For instance, numerous past attempts at legislating
transparency have failed to address serious problems with executive-
compensation practices, as new laws generally lead to the creation of
new instruments for disguising compensation. 208 Judge Rakoff's ideas
would likely increase transparency by simply enforcing existing regula-
tions in a more efficient and fair manner. As transparency in execu-
tive compensation increases, nonlegal sanctions can also become
effective tools for addressing executive-compensation problems.209
Increasing transparency and focusing on individuals will mean that
emotions like guilt, embarrassment, and shame will attach to certain
executive-compensation plans and decisions, and these considerations
will likely alter the behavior of executives and directors. Using the
courts to alter the SEC's enforcement process will allow the existing
regulatory regime to continue, and the result will be the production
of accurate and clear information concerning executive
compensation.
Additionally, this approach has several advantages over recently
proposed legislation, namely the Excessive Pay Act and the Bill of
Rights Act.210 Perhaps most importantly, since Senators Durbin, Schu-
mer, and Cantwell introduced these bills, the Senate has not acted on
them. Thus, relying on new legislation to address executive-compen-
sation problems does not seem to be an effective strategy, as there
appears to be a lack of political support for these proposals.2i" Addi-
tionally, if Congress did act, powerful interest groups might influence
the legislation, making the rules less effective. 212 Finally, the pro-
posed bills go beyond what is a much simpler means of addressing the
206 Marie Leone, Bank of America Waives Attorney-Client Privilege, CFO.com (Oct. 13,
2009), http://www.cfomagazine.com/article.cfm/14447248/c_14447644?f=home-todayin
finance.
207 See id.
208 Martin, supra note 81, at 153.
209 See Gopalan, supra note 187, at 760.
210 See discussion supra Part III.D.
211 See Bebchuk, supra note 18, at 843.
212 See id.
2010] 199
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
problem. For instance, the Bill of Rights Act would make staggered
boards illegal, which could have dramatic consequences, including al-
lowing powerful investors to manipulate a company or its managers
into pursuing unwise, short-term strategies.213
Judge Rakoffs approach also avoids the problems of relying on
shareholder derivative suits to address executive-compensation
problems. First, Judge Rakoff's approach would utilize the SEC,
which avoids a collective-action problem among shareholders and pre-
vents a victorious shareholder from prevailing at the expense of other
shareholders. Also, as previously noted, courts are very likely to dis-
miss shareholder suits against corporate executives and directors, so
derivative actions against executives and directors who fail to accu-
rately and fully disclose executive-compensation information are prob-
ably incapable of addressing these problems.214
CONCLUSION
As Coffee notes, putting "the genie back in the bottle" is diffi-
cult.21 5 Although the effect of Judge Rakoff's decision in SEC v. Bank
of America Corp. is still uncertain, and although the extent to which
other judges will follow his approach is unclear, Judge Rakoffs deci-
sion to reject the proposed settlement presents a framework that
could be applied to SEC enforcement of existing executive-compensa-
tion regulations. There are numerous problems with executive-com-
pensation practices, but using the courts to police the SEC in a
manner that will address the problems appears to be a promising
solution.
At its core, the expanded agency problem of executive compensa-
tion requires that resources be used to monitor and constrain corpo-
rate executives and directors. Corporations have created massive
amounts of wealth, but that wealth has not always gone to those who
are most entitled to it. This is largely due to the shareholder collec-
tive-action problem, the ability of executives to influence the directors
who determine executive-compensation practices, and the ability of
executives and directors to camouflage executive compensation. In
the past twenty years, legislation and numerous proposals have sur-
faced, and the regulatory framework now requires that companies dis-
close not only what they pay their executives but also why they pay
them these amounts. New legislation that would go further has been
proposed, but this legislation does not seem necessary or likely to
gather sufficient political support for Congress to enact it.
213 Katz & McIntosh, supra note 106.
214 See supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
215 Coffee, supra note 136, at 5.
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If other courts adoptJudge Rakoffs approach and apply it to SEC
enforcement actions based on failures to comply with rules governing
the disclosure of executive-compensation information, executive-com-
pensation practices will likely improve. Although this approach re-
quires that the SEC pursue individuals and companies that have not
complied with the disclosure regulations, nothing suggests that the
SEC is incapable of pursuing these cases. Judge Rakoffs reasoning in
SEC v. Bank ofAmerica Corp. would lead to investors having more infor-
mation and corporate directors having to provide accurate reasons for
their compensation practices, both of which have the potential to
eliminate the ability of disingenuous executives and directors to cam-
ouflage executive compensation. As this process compels directors to
present executive-compensation information, the flaws of the current
practices can be addressed, and the extent of any remaining problems
is likely to be much clearer, enabling future commentators to build
upon this judicially policed disclosure framework.
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